Tag Archives: Law Students

Legal Job | Legal Expert at Bamra Wildlife Division, Odisha [Salary Rs 50K]: Walk in Interview on Nov 12

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About the Job

The Divisional Forest Officer of Bamra Wildlife Division invites applications from interested candidates. They are looking to engage a Legal Expert to work in the office of the Bamra Wildlife Division for the year 2025-26.

Eligibility

  • Candidate must have LL.B. degree with minimum 2 (Two) years of work experience.
  • Candidate having prior experience of dealing with forest & wildlife offence matter.

Salary

Rs. 50,000/- month

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Application Procedure

Interested candidates are required to submit in their CVs along with the requisite documents to email id dfobmbwl004@gmail.com and shall appear for Walk-In-Interview in the office of the DFO, Bamra Wildlife Division on 12.11.2025 by 11:00 AM

The official notification is here.

Part-Time Legal Associate / Legal Intern @ Juris at Work [Remote]: Apply Now!

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About Juris at Work

Juris at Work has been providing top-notch legal services to the clients globally. The team specialises in providing remote legal assistance, ensuring that you have access to expert advice and comprehensive solutions irrespective of where you are located.

Juris at Work is committed to providing professional and personalised services to each and every one of their clients. With a network of experienced and seasoned legal professionals from around the world.

They offer top-tier legal services tailored to your needs.

About the Position

You will assist and support on matters involving:

  • Drafting and reviewing transactional and investment-related agreements, including SAFE, Shareholders’ Agreements, Subscription Agreements, Share Purchase Agreements, and other corporate governance/compliance documentation.
  • Coordinating and managing grant applications, including preparation and submissions.
  • Preparation, review, and tracking of investor relations documents, equity paperwork, cap tables, etc.
  • General contractual assistance, such as drafting, reviewing contracts, and conducting supporting due diligence.
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Who Should Apply?

  1. You have experience (or strong internship experience) in transactional / corporate law not just commercial contracts like NDAs and Service Agreements.
  2. You have worked with US / International clients or cross-border documentation.
  3. Interns are welcome if you have prior hands-on exposure to transactional drafting (through internships, cases, or projects). You will not be trained for this position. Please apply only if you can independently handle transactional contracts.
  4. Candidates from LPO backgrounds are highly encouraged to apply.
  5. Please do not apply if you have no exposure to corporate/transactional drafting.
  6. If you only have experience with drafting and reviewiing commercial contracts like SaaS, Service Agreements, NDA, etc., please do not apply.

Work Details

This is a Remote part time job requiring 4 hours a day from 7 pm IST 11-11:30 PM IST.

It shall expose you to working with high level US Transactions.

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Stipend

Compensation/Stipend will be discussed based on experience and skill level.

How to Apply?

DM your CV and cover letter via LinkedIn Notification (link is given below) detailing experience with transactional legal contracts.

You can also email them your CV and cover letter at the mail given below.

Contact

Email: jurisatworkinfo@gmail.com.

Click here for the LinkedIn Notification.

Powergrid Law Officer Recruitment 2025: Apply Online

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Powergrid Law Officer Recruitment 2025 Notification of 07 Positions: POWERGRID, a premier organization under the Ministry of Power, Government of India, is at the forefront of the nation’s power transmission sector. It invites online applications from eligible Fresher Law Graduates who appear in CLAT 2026 exam to join as OFFICER TRAINEE (LAW) and contribute to the transformational journey of the country towards a robust power infrastructure.

The POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025 online application process requires candidates to first appear for CLAT 2026 (Post Graduation). Interested and eligible candidates must carefully read the detailed POWERGRID notification before applying.

POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025

Advt. No. CC/06/2025

Job TitleOfficer Trainee (Law)
Total Vacancies07
Age Limit28 years
Monthly Salary₹ 40,000/- during training; ₹ 50,000 – 1,60,000/- (E-2) post regularization
Minimum QualificationLLB (3/5 years) with 60% marks
Selection ProcessCLAT 2026 + GD + PI + Medical
Job LocationPan India
Last Date05/12/2025
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POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) 2025 Age Limit:

  • 28 years as on 05.12.2025.
  • Age relaxation: OBC (NCL): 3 years; SC/ST: 5 years; PwBD: 10 years

POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) 2025 Eligibility Criteria:

  • Full-time Three years LLB or Five years integrated Law/LLB course with not less than 60% marks or equivalent CGPA from a recognized Institute/University.
  • Candidates must appear in CLAT 2026 (for Post Graduation admission).

POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) 2025 Selection Process:

CLAT – 2026 Score, Behavioral Assessment, Document Verification, Group Discussion, Personal Interview & Pre-Employment Medical Examination

POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) 2025 Application Fee:

CategoryApplication Fee
General / OBC / EWS₹ 500/-
SC / ST / PwBDNil
Payment MethodOnline (Non-refundable)
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POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) 2025 Important Dates:

Start of CLAT 2026 Registration01st August 2025
Closing Date for CLAT 2026 Application31st October 2025
Commencement of POWERGRID Online Application14th November 2025 (17:00 hrs)
Last Date for POWERGRID Online Application05th December 2025 (23:59 hrs)
Cut-Off Date for Eligibility05th December 2025

POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) 2025 Important Links:

Detailed Notification PDFClick Here
CLAT 2026 Apply Online LinkClick Here
POWERGRID Official WebsiteClick Here
Latest Law Jobs ListClick Here
Join WhatsApp ChannelsWhatsApp 

How to Apply POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025:

The application process involves appearing for CLAT 2026 first, followed by POWERGRID online registration. The steps are as follows:-

➢ Step 1: Register and apply for CLAT 2026 (Post Graduation) on the Consortium website from 01.08.2025 to 31.10.2025. Appear for the exam.

➢ Step 2: After CLAT results, register online on POWERGRID website (https://www.powergrid.in) from 14.11.2025 to 05.12.2025. Provide CLAT Application No., Roll Number, and other details.

➢ Step 3: Pay the application fee (if applicable) through online mode. Submit the form before 05.12.2025 (23:59 hrs).

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Frequently Asked Questions:

What is the age limit for POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025?

28 years as on 05.12.2025. Upper age relaxation: OBC (NCL): 3 years; SC/ST: 5 years; PwBD: 10 years.

What are the eligibility criteria for POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025?

Full-time 3-year LLB or 5-year integrated LLB with minimum 60% marks or equivalent CGPA. Candidates must appear in CLAT 2026 (PG).

What is the selection process for POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025?

CLAT 2026 score, Behavioral Assessment, Document Verification, Group Discussion, Personal Interview, and Pre-Employment Medical Examination.

What is the last date to apply for POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025?

05th December 2025 (23:59 hrs) for POWERGRID application; CLAT registration closes on 31st October 2025.

What is the total number of vacancies for POWERGRID Officer Trainee (Law) Recruitment 2025?

07 posts for Officer Trainee (Law).

MCQ Law of Contract [Part-3]

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101. The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to 

 (a) The knowledge of that person 

(b) The object of the offer 

(c) The intention with which offer is made 

(d) The facts underlying the offer 

Ans.a

102. A person making a proposal is called ………….. 

(a) Promisor  

(b) Vendor  

(c) Contractor  

(d) Promise  

Ans.a

103. Which one of the following will constitute a valid acceptance?  

 (a) An enquiry as to fitness of the subject matter of contract.  

(b) A provisional acceptance  

(c) Addition of a superfluous term, while accepting an offer.  

(d) A conditional acceptance.  

Ans.a

104. Which one of the following statements is true?  

(a) Offer and acceptance are revocable  

(b) Offer and acceptance are irrevocable  

(c) An offer can be revoked but acceptance cannot 

(d) An offer cannot be revoked but acceptance can be revoked.  

Ans.a

105. The Communication of acceptance through telephone is regarded as complete when:  

 (a) Acceptance is spoken on the phone.  

(b) Acceptance comes to the knowledge of party proposing.  

(c) Acceptance is put in the course of transmission.  

(d) Acceptance has done whatever is required to be done by him.  

Ans.b

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106. Which one of the following falls into the category of offer?  

 (a) Newspaper advertisement regarding sale. 

(b) Display of goods by a shopkeeper in his window with prices marked on them  

(c) An advertisement for a concert.  

(d) Announcement of reward to the public.   

Ans.d

107. A sees an article marked “Price Rupees Twenty” in B’s shop .He offers B  20 for the article. B refuses to sell saying the article is not for sale. Advice A.  

(a) A cannot force B to sell the article at ` 20  

(b) A can force B to sell the article at ` 20  

(c) A can claim damages  

(d) A can sue B in the Court. 

Ans.a 

 108. Which one of the following statements is incorrect?  

 (a) Oral acceptance is a valid acceptance.  

(b) Mere silence is not acceptance  

(c) Acceptance must be communicated  

(d) Acceptance may not be in the prescribed manner  

Ans.d

109. Consider the following statement: 

(1) There is no difference between the English Law and Indian Law with regard to acceptance through post. (2) Both Under the English Law and the Indian Law a contract is concluded when the letter of acceptance is posted. (3) Under the Indian Law when the Letter of acceptance is posted it is completed only as against the proposer. 

Which of the above statements is/are correct?  

 (a)1 and 2 

(b) 2 alone 

(c) 3 alone 

(d) None 

Ans.c

110. In Commercial and business agreements, the intention of the parties to create legal relationship is   

 (a) Presumed to exist  

(b) To be specifically expressed in writing  

(c) Not relevant or all  

(d) Not applicable.  

Ans.a

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111. An agreement is a Voidable Contract when it is  

(a) Enforceable  

(b) Enforceable by Law at the option of the aggrieved party  

(c) Enforceable by both the parties  

(d) Not enforceable at all. 

Ans.b 

 112. A Contract creates………….. 

 (a) Rights in personam  

(b) Rights in rem  

(c) Only rights and no obligations  

(d) Only Obligations and no rights.  

Ans.a

 113. An agreement not enforceable by Law is said to be void under section ……………. of the Indian Contract Act.  

(a) Section 2(a)  

(b) Section 2(b)  

(c) Section 2(f)  

(d) Section 2(g)  

Ans.d

114. When the contract is perfectly valid in its substance but cannot be enforced because of certain technical defects. This is called a/ an-  

 (a) Unilateral Contract  

(b) Bilateral Contract  

(c) Unenforceable Contract  

(d) Void Contract  

Ans.c

 115. The term” Proposal or offer” has been defined in – of the Indian contract Act.  

 (a) Section 2(a)  

(b) Section 2(b)  

(c) Section 2(c)  

(d) Section 2(d)  

Ans.a

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 116. The term” Promise” has been defined in ………….. of the Indian Contract Act.  

(a) Section 2(a)  

(b) Section 2(b)  

(c) Section 2(c)  

(d) Section 2(d)  

Ans.b

 117. The person making the proposal is called ………….  

 (a) Promisor  

(b) Promisee  

(c) Participator  

(d) Principal   

Ans.a

118. Offer implied from conduct of parties or from circumstances of the case is called ………..  

(a) Implied offer  

(b) Express offer  

(c) General offer  

(d) Specific offer 

Ans.a

 119. An offer made to a (i) Specific person, or (ii) a group of persons is known as 

(a) Standing offer  

(b) Specific offer  

(c) Special offer  

(d) Separate offer  

Ans.b

 120. Communication of proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of ………..  

(a) The person to whom it is made  

(b) The proposer  

(c) Either (a) or (b)  

(d) The Court.  

Ans.a

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121. Terms of an offer must be ……… 

 (a) Ambiguous  

(b) Uncertain  

(c) Definite  

(d) Vague

Ans.c  

 122. A contingent contract is 

 (a) Void  

(b) Voidable  

(c) Valid  

(d) Illegal  

Ans.c

123. A contract is said to be discharged or terminated 

 (a) When the rights and obligation are completed  

(b) When the contract becomes voidable  

(c) Both (a) & (b)  

(d) None of the above  

Ans.a

124. Which is not the mode of discharge of contract 

 (a) Performance of contract  

(b) Lapse of time  

(c) Breach of contract  

(d) Injunction 

Ans.d 

 125. A person finds certain goods belonging to some other persons. In such a case, the finder 

 (a) Becomes the owner of that good  

(b) Is under a duty to trace the real owner  

(c) Can sell that good if true owner is not found  

(d) Both (b) & (c)  

Ans.d

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126. If in a contract, the time lapses and if the party fails to perform the contract within specified time the contract becomes  

(a) Voidable  

(b) Void  

(c) Illegal  

(d) Enforceable in the court  

Ans.a

127. Change in one or more of the important terms in a contract, it is the case of 

 (a) Novation  

(b) Rescission  

(c) Remission  

(d) Alternation  

Ans.d

128. In both the cases, devolution of joint liabilities and devolution of joint rights, if a promisor dies, who will perform on behalf of him 

 (a) Other promiser   

(b) His legal representation  

(c) Both (a) & (b)  

(d) None of the above  

Ans.c

129. A contract which is impossible to perform is 

 (a) Voidable  

(b) Void  

(c) Illegal  

(d) Enforceable  

Ans.b

130. A party entitled to rescind the contract, loses the remedy where 

(a) He has ratified the contract  

(b) Third party has acquired right in good faith  

(c) Contract is not separable  

(d) All of the above  

Ans.d

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131. The special damages i.e. the damages which arises due to some special or unusual circumstances  

(a) Are not recoverable altogether  

(b) Are illegal being positive in nature  

(c) Cannot be claimed as a matter of right  

(d) Can be claimed as a matter of right  

Ans.d

132. Which of the following statement is/are correct  

 (a) Ordinary damages are recoverable  

(b) Special damages are recoverable only if parties know about them  

(c) Remote or indirect damages are not recoverable  

(d) All of these  

Ans.c

133. Exemplary damages are not awarded in such case  

(a) Breach of promise to marry  

(b) Wrongful dishonour & customers cheque by banker  

(c) Breach of any business contract    

(d) None of the above  

Ans.b

134. Damages which the contracting parties fix at the time of contract in case of breach  

 (a) Unliquidated Damages  

(b) Liquidated Damages  

(c) Nominal Damages  

(d) None of the above  

Ans.b

135. A order of court restraining a person from doing a particular act, it’s a case of 

(a) Specific performance 

(b) Injunction 

(c) Both (a) & (b) 

(d) None of the above 

Ans.b 

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136. Under the Indian Contract Act, the contract of indemnity is restricted to such cases  

 (a) Where the loss promise to be reimbursed is caused by the conduct of the promisor or any other person  

(b) The loss caused by the any events or accident which does not depend upon conduct of any person  

(c) Both (a) & (b)  

(d) None  

Ans.b

137. What is the ratio of parties in contract of indemnity and contract of guarantee  

 (a) 2 : 3  

(b) 3 : 2  

(c) 1 : 3  

(d) 2 : 1  

Ans.a

138. In contract of indemnity, what is the liability of indemnifier against the indemnified 

 (a) Primary  

(b) Secondary   

(c) No liability  

(d) Both (a) & (b)  

Ans.a

139. In case of contract of guarantee, what is the liability of the surety against the principal debtor 

 (a) Primary  

(b) Secondary  

(c) No liability  

(d) Fully liable  

Ans.b

140. Which is not the case of discharge of surety  

 (a) By notice of revocation  

(b) By death of surety  

(c) If creditor releases the principal debtor  

(d) None of the above  

Ans.d

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141. What is the right of the bailee against the goods 

 (a) Owner  

(b) Possessor  

(c) Bailee can sell those goods  

(d) Both (a) & (b)  

Ans.b

142. In case of Contract of guarantee, if the creditor loses or parts with any security which the debtor provides him at time of contract, the surety is discharged to the extent of 

 (a) The value of the security  

(b) The surety can be fully discharged  

(c) The surety can claim damages  

(d) All of the above  

Ans.a

143. Which one is not the duties of bailee  

 (a) The bailee must take care of goods as of his goods.  

(b) The bailee cannot use bailor’s goods in an unauthorised manner.  

(c) The bailee should return the goods without demand on the expiry of the time period.   

(d) He can set up adverse title to the goods.  

Ans.d

 144. A lien which is available only against that property of which the skill and labour have been exercised 

 (a) General Lien  

(b) Particular Lien  

(c) Ordinary Lien  

(d) Both (a) & (b)

Ans.b  

145. Which is not the case of termination of bailment 

 (a) Where the bailee wrongfully uses or disposes of the goods bailed.  

(b) When the period of bailment expires  

(c) When the object of bailment has been achieved  

(d) None of the above  

Ans.d

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146. An agency may also arise by 

 (a) Estoppel  

(b) Necessity  

(c) Ratification  

(d) All of the above  

Ans.d

 147. A mercantile agent employed to sell goods which have been placed in his possession or contract to buy goods for his principal 

 (a) Factors  

(b) Brokers  

(c) Del Credere Agent  

(d) Auctioneers  

Ans.a

147. The threat to commit suicide amounts to  

 (a) Coercion  

(b) Undue influence  

(c) Misrepresentation  

(d) Fraud  

Ans.a

 148. Consensus-ad-idem is an essential of   

 (a) Agreement   

(b) Promise  

(c) Both (a) & (b)  

(d) Consideration  

Ans.a

149. Agreement which are not contracts  

 (a) Social Matters  

(b) Relating to partnership  

(c) Domestic Agreements  

(d) Both (a) & (c)  

Ans.b

150. Offeror is ………… 

(a) Party to whom offer is made  

(b) Third party  

(c) Party making an offer   

(d) None of the above  

Ans.c

Swapnil Tripathi & Ors VS Supreme Court Of India & Ors

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This Case Summary is written by Pragati Singh, a student at Law College, Lucknow

SYNOPSIS 

The present case brought a very prominent but undeterred issue in disseminating the judgements which bind the whole territory. Moreover, the advent of pandemics and recent changes in the functioning of Courts makes this judgement more cardinal. Though the judgement is highly praised, it still has some inadequacy. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court of India with the request of making court proceedings available to litigants, advocates, students of law and the general public keeping in mind the Right Of Access to Justice and heavily packed courtrooms on miscellaneous days. 

FACTS

The petitioners and interventionists under Article 32 have sought a declaration that the Supreme Court case proceedings of “constitutional importance having an impact on the public at large or a large number of people” should be live-streamed in a manner that is easily accessible or public viewing. 

Further, the petitioners sought a proper and balanced regulatory framework before the concept of live streaming of the Court proceedings. Further, guidelines to enable the determination of exceptional cases that qualify for live streaming. 

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Petitioners, to corroborate their claim, have relied on a nine-judge bench of the Apex Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. which held that Article 19(1)(a) included journalists’ right to publish a report of the proceedings which they had witnessed and heard in Court. 

In the abovementioned case, the Court emphasized about the efficacy of open trials for “upholding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Courts and for enhancement of public confidence and support”. 

ISSUES 

Whether live dissemination of proceedings should be introduced with the aid of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and if so, under what conditions and exceptions? 

CONTENTIONS 

The petitioners submitted that the Right Of Access To Justice under Article 21 of the Constitution or be it the concept of justice at the doorstep, would be meaningful only if the public gets access to the proceedings. Live proceedings will educate public at large about the issues which come up for consideration before the Court on real time basis.

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As no person can plead ignorance of law, there is corresponding obligation on the State to spread awareness about the law and the developments including the evolution of the law which may happen in the process of adjudication of cases before the Court. 

The right to know and receive information, is a facet of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the public is entitled to witness Court proceedings involving issues having an impact on the public at large or a section of the public.  

Litigants involved in large number of cases pending before the Courts throughout the country will be benefitted if access to Court proceedings is made possible by way of live streaming of Court proceedings. Hence, it will increase productivity and save time. 

Article 145(4) of the Constitution states that pronouncements of judgments by the Supreme Court shall be made in open Court. The concept of “open Court hearing” can be traced to Section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and Section 153-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). 

Live streaming of Court proceedings with the use of technology is to “virtually” expand the court room area beyond the physical four walls of the court rooms. It will epitomize transparency, good governance and accountability, and will accommodate a large number of viewers to witness the live Court proceedings. 

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Publication of court proceedings of the Supreme Court is a facet of the status of the Court as a Court of Record by virtue of Article 129 of the Constitution. 

JUDGEMENT 

Justice Khanwilkar delivered the majority judgement on behalf of himself and Chief Justice Dipak Misra. Justice Chandrachud delivered a concurring judgement. 

The Court admitted looking up to proposal of Advisory Council of the National Mission of Justice Delivery and Legal Reforms to initiate audio video recording on an experimental basis in the Courts. Policy and Action Plan Document for Phase II for the e-Courts Mission Mode Project proposed audio video recording of Court proceedings but was deferred as it required consultation with Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. 

MAJORITY JUDGEMENT 

The Court agreed with the comprehensive guidelines for live streaming of Court proceedings suggested by the Attorney General Shri K.K. Venugopal. 

The project of live streaming on the “internet” and/or on radio and TV universally by an official agency, such as Doordarshan, will be implemented in phased manner, with safeguards such that it does not interfere with the administration of justice of the Court hearing the matter and/or impinge upon any rights of the litigants or witnesses. 

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The project will be executed in phases, before the commencement of first phase formal rules will be framed by the Court to incorporate the recommendations made by the learned Attorney General. 

The Court laid down measures for efficient management of the project such as; (i) appointment of technical committee, (ii) specialist video operator(s), (iii) focus and direction of the camera(s), (iv) case management system, (v) copyright of the Court over broadcast material, (vi) reproduction, re-broadcasting, transmission, publication, re-publication, copying, storage and/or modification rights and its liabilities. 

The Court reiterated that the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 will be amended to provide for the regulatory framework. Therefore, accepted the PIL in larger public interest so as to uphold the constitutional rights of public and the litigants. 

CONCURRING JUDGEMENT 

The Court addressed the importance of “principle of open justice”. Drawing a link between open justice and democratic values, R (Binyam Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was cited. 

Open courts allow the public to view courtroom proceedings which is salient feature to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Also, keeps a check on the process of adjudication in judicial proceedings.

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Open courts foster public confidence by allowing litigants and public to view courtroom proceedings and ensure that the judges apply the law in a fair and impartial manner. To preserve the rule of law public confidence in the judiciary is crucial. 

All courts in India are open to the public except when the administration of justice requires public access to the court to be restricted. The concept of open court and access to justice was reinforced in majority decision of nine-judge bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra. 

Again, in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation value of hearing and principle that justice must also be seen to be done was reiterated. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah Justice Ahmadi dwelt on the significance of disseminating information in a democracy. 

The essence of open courts is diminished as large segment of the society rarely witness court proceedings. This might be due to poverty, illiteracy, distance, cost and lack of awareness. Litigants depend on information provided by lawyers; others depend on the information provided about judicial decisions in newspapers. 

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Taking technological developments into consideration the Court in Krishna Veni Nagam v. Harish Nagam put forward the use of video conferencing for certain cases. 

Further, means and ends of technology and its implementation to fulfil the objectives of e-Courts Project were widely elaborated. Functions and application of National Judicial Data Grid and platforms created for service delivery like, e-Courts Portal, e-Courts Services mobile app, SMS Push/Pull, Automated E-Mails, Touch Screen Kiosks and Service Centre, E-Payment and E- Filing database were detailed. 

Reasoning as to why live-streaming will be beneficial to the judicial system were distinctly laid down and compared with countries across globe. A pilot project of live-streaming of national and constitutional importance for about three-months was suggested. 

The Court comprehensively laid down kind of matters to be live-streamed as a form of Model Guidelines for broadcasting of the proceedings. It further laid down manner of live streaming, technical specifications for live-streaming, communications that shall not be filmed, archiving rights and facilities and broadcast room. 

ANALYSIS 

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The judgement starts with submission by the petitioners, recommendations by the learned Attorney General for India, comparative study of Courts of countries across the globe and elaborative guidelines by the Court. By means of live proceedings in the absence of official transcription, recordings will serve as oral transcripts. Dissemination of live proceedings flows from Principle of Open Court, Right to Know and Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. The judgement serves the means of transparency in Judiciary, it being the most trusted body which has been ascribed with the responsibility of keeping a check on other bodies. 

Appreciation Of The Judgement 

The judgement deems fit in taking cognizance of the matter of disseminating Right of Access to Justice which includes Right to Access Live Court Proceedings. Both majority and concurring judgement distinctively laid down guidelines, procedure, application, prevention and precautions to be taken during live proceedings. 

Criticism Of The Judgement 

  • TEST OF ALL TIMES
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The advent of pandemic brought even Courts to a still but technology came as a rescue apparatus and aided the process of adjudication. After being restricted to judge, courtroom stakeholders and functionaries for a prolonged period in a very first move by Calcutta High Court, immediately after lockdown, the Kerala High Court live-streamed its proceedings. In June 2020, Delhi High Court in its highly appreciated move allowed public to witness live court proceedings. When the Supreme Court started hearing matters via video conferencing, even the Supreme Court Bar Association raised a demand for live-streaming the hearing. 

To further the ends of justice and legitimize the present case and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., live streaming of video conferences shall be done at earliest. 

Though, in a recent move, Chief Justice N. V. Ramana in a virtual address launched an official Supreme Court mobile application which would aid journalists to view the Supreme Court’s witness virtual proceedings. However, currently the application is temporary and “only” devices registered with the Public Relations Office would be able to access links through it. Thus, the judgement fails to pass the test of all time. The Court, abiding by its own judgement should make the virtual proceedings available to public also. The Chairman of e-Committee of the Supreme Court delivered the concurring judgement and therefore, it becomes more pertinent to take cognizance of the ‘Principle of Open Justice’ which seems to be missing in these extraordinary times. 

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  • THE MISSING ELEMENT 

To further Right of Access to Justice, transparency under the ambit of Article 129 of the Constitution which allows Supreme Court to publish court proceedings so that “acts and proceedings are enrolled for perpetual memory and testimony”, along with live proceedings and its archives, written briefs by the Counsels can be uploaded on a database. 

The Court may decide the exceptions in case of written briefs in a similar manner like broadcasting of cases as live proceedings. Written briefs shall be voluntary in nature and subject to concerns of privacy, confidentiality of witnesses and litigants to preserve and protect the sentiments of public at large. Publication of written briefs on public domain will serve the purpose of comprehensive understanding of the case. Further, the Court may make publication of briefs compulsory for the cases at are of utmost public importance and concern.  

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It is suggested with the idea of educating the general public at large about the cases going on in the Courts of Law that stand as precedent and affect lives of each citizen and non-citizen. Publication of written brief will assist understanding of subsequent cases and interpretation of law as per the needs of the society. Moreover, as judgements too present arguments in a concise manner and case files are not easily accessible, written briefs will serve as an aid for the practising litigants and students of law. 

CONCLUSION 

Such a technology can revolutionize Indian courts indeed; but we should be wary about the fundamental rights of every citizen and Indian constitutional framework. Even in the remotest of areas, the Supreme Court of India has triumphed in its duty to uphold the flag of Right of Access to Justice. In both majority and concurring judgement, the Court enacted elaborative guidelines over the kinds of matter to be live-streamed, manner of live-stream, technical specification, archiving and other miscellaneous broadcasting rules. Hence it becomes apparent from the judgement that even the Highest Court of Appeals of India, which shoulders the burden to keep a check on the other organs of the state, desires transparency and scrutinization for the benefit of every citizen. 

SHATRUGHAN CHAUHAN ANR V. UNION OF INDIA

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This Case Summary is written by Nandini Arya, a student at National Law University, Jodhpur

SYNOPSIS

The Shatrughan Chauhan case is indeed a landmark judgement delivered by the honourable Supreme Court of India. It upheld death-row convicts’ rights irrespective of the nature of the crime committed. The court held that capital punishment of death-row convicts could be commuted if there is an inordinate and unreasonable delay by the executive or if the convict suffers from insanity. The court also held that the death-row convicts could not be kept in solitary confinement. Despite its merits, the judgement has raised certain apprehensions among various legal scholars and jurists. It is also pertinent to note that human-rights activists demand the abolition of capital punishment altogether. Thus, there’s a long way to go in the field of human rights.

BACKGROUND

In Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State (NCT) of Delhi, the court held that mere delay cannot be the sole basis for clemency. The case also distinguished between the death-row convicts booked under TADA and other death-row convicts. 

The petitioners in the present case represent death-row convicts. These death-row convicts have been waiting for years for their mercy petition to be decided. The death-row convicts are booked under various sections. Some of them are booked under TADA. 

A three-judge bench was formed by the Supreme Court to deliver the judgement. The bench being larger, overruled the ratio laid in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar vs. State (NCT) of Delhi. Mr T.R. Andhyarujina was appointed as the amicus-curiae of the case.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Several writ petitions were filed under article 32 of the Indian Constitution in the Supreme Court of India either by the death-row convicts or by their relatives or by People’s Union for Democratic Rights and other like-minded public-spirited bodies. After the death-row convicts were awarded capital punishment by the Supreme Court of India, a mercy petition was filed before the Governor or the President.

The petitioners have alleged unreasonable delay in rejecting the mercy petitions. Some of the petitioners have further stated that the death-row convicts were suffering from mental illness. Solitary confinement, judgments declared per incuriam and procedural lapses were other grounds for filing the writ petition.

Thus, the petitioners have prayed that the death sentence rendered to the convicts be commuted to life imprisonment after the mercy petition has been rejected by the President and the Governor. The petitioners prayed that the rejection of mercy petitions by the President and the Governor in the present case be declared as ultra vires. 

It was further prayed that a set of guidelines be formed by the Supreme Court of India when a mercy petition is to be considered and the rights of death row convicts are duly protected by the Supreme Court.  

ISSUES

  1. Whether unreasonable delay in rejecting a mercy petition can be a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  2. Whether the mental illness of a death-row convict be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  3. Whether solitary confinement of a death-row convict be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  4. Whether procedural lapses in rejecting a mercy petition be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
  5. Whether the judgements declared per incuriam later by the Supreme Court be regarded as a valid ground for commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment?
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CONTENTIONS

The petitioners have argued the following – 

  1. The decision of the death penalty is not being challenged rather the supervening events that occurred after the confirmation of the death penalty are the basis for filing the petition.
  2. The mercy petitions of the death-row convicts were rejected without taking into account the supervening circumstances such as delay, solitary confinement, insanity, procedural lapses and judgements declared per incuriam.
  3. Executing a death penalty after an inordinate and unreasonable delay would infringe the death-row convicts’ fundamental right under article 21. Hence, the convict can approach the court by filing a writ petition.
  4. Human life is sacred and inviolable. Therefore, every effort shall be made to protect it.
  5. The death-row convicts are protected under article 21 till their last breath. It includes the death-row convicts which were booked under TADA.
  6. The procedure for rejecting a mercy petition was not duly followed and hence, it led to serious injustice to both the death-row convicts and their families.

The respondents have argued the following –

  1. For examining a mercy petition, many documents have to be procured from various authorities. Thus, it takes a lot of time.
  2. There cannot a specific time limit to decide a mercy petition. It varies on the number of mercy petitions filed, the nature of the case and the scope of inquiry to be made.
  3. The courts cannot fix any time limit on their own since no time limit is fixed for the president under article 72 for the same.
  4. The power of the president under article 72 is discretionary and it overrides all laws, rules and regulations in force.
  5. Delay by itself does not entail the person under sentence of death to request for commutation of a sentence into life imprisonment. It is against the victim’s interest.
  6. Delay in the execution of a death sentence must not be a ground for commutation because the crime committed by the accused is heinous.
  7. The judiciary should not decide if an unreasonable delay is apparent. The matter should be referred back to the executive.
  8. The death-row convicts were not kept under solitary confinement. They were statutorily segregated for safety purposes.
  9. The cases, on which various courts have prescribed the death penalty to the death-row convicts at present, were not held to be per incuriam by any court.
  10. There were no procedural lapses involved. 

FINDINGS

On the basis of the facts and the arguments advanced from both the parties, the court held the following –

  1. The power of the President and the Governor to grant pardon is distinct, absolute and unfettered in nature. This power to grant pardon is not limited to death sentence cases.
  2. The executive orders regarding the grant of pardon are under limited judicial review with only the manner of exercise of executive power being under judicial review.
  3. Long undue delay in the execution of a death sentence entitles the death-row convict to approach the court under article 32. Long undue delay causes adverse physical conditions and psychological stresses on the death-row convict.
  4. Article 21 of the Constitution extends to the stage of execution of the sentence and undue, inordinate and unreasonable delay in execution of death sentence attribute to torture which violates Article 21. 
  5. Insanity is a relevant supervening factor for consideration and the person declared insane cannot be executed under article 21.
  6. Solitary confinement is not sanctioned by Section 30 of the Prisons Act for death-row convicts. It would amount to infliction of “additional and separate” punishment not authorized by law. 
  7. The contention by the petitioners that the judgements on which the court relied have been held per incuriam does not hold any ground. These judgements were clarified and they were not applied in some special cases.

REASONING

The court gave the following reasons for its decision –

  1. The power of the President and the governor under article 72 and article 161 respectively is a constitutional duty. It is neither a matter of grace nor a matter of privilege. 
  2. The court has limited judicial review powers because there’s a presumption that the executive works with an application of mind and it is irrelevant to lay down specific guidelines.
  3. The manner of exercise of executive orders is subject to judicial review to ensure that the constitutional authorities consider all the relevant materials before concluding.
  4. The right of the convicts under article 21 should be considered along with the right of the victims.
  5. The procedure prescribed by law, which deprives a person of his life and liberty must be just, fair and reasonable.
  6. The death-row convicts in the present case have approached the court as a victim of the violation of guaranteed fundamental rights under the Constitution seeking commutation of sentence.
  7. All the cases of capital punishment fall under the rarest of rare case. Thus, there cannot be a further distinction between the convicts.
  8. No decision was held per-incuriam. Rather they were clarified and distinguished from that case.
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS

This landmark case attempted to ‘humanise’ capital punishment. Before this judgement, the process related to infliction of capital punishment after it has been announced by the Supreme Court was entirely under the executive domain. This judgment held that there can be judicial intervention if the executive function is discharged arbitrarily.

This judgement was important since there was no check on the process of mercy petition before. It gives a ray of hope to human rights activist. Even though capital punishment is in itself against humanity, this judgement is a step towards recognizing convicts’ rights. This judgement refused to distinguish between death-row convicts based on the nature of the crime. Thus, it overruled Devender Pal Singh Bhullar’s case.

The executive can no longer delay the mercy petition by giving unreasonable excuses. The honourable court has struck a perfect balance between the victim’s rights and the convict’s rights. The court also did commendable work in maintaining the doctrine of “separation of powers”.

However, despite various positive effects of the judgement, the following are the apprehensions raised by various scholars, legal jurists and lawyers –

  1. There’s an apprehension that the victim’s right might be curtailed by commuting the convict’s punishment. Also, the convict may exploit the procedural lapses and lead to a delay in his mercy petition. Thus, apprehension was on the rise during the Nirbhaya case.
  2. Nick Robinson has rightly said that there are many supreme courts of India. The supreme court has not shown a consistent approach in its judgement. While it upheld the convict’s rights, it has failed to properly recognise the LGBTQ+ community’s rights as a natural human right.
  3. There are only a few countries left where capital punishment is present. India is one of them. It is high time that capital punishment is absolved altogether.
  4. The honourable court, in this case, relied on certain foreign cases as well. However, in various instances, the court has reprimanded the counsels for relying on foreign cases.
  5. We must respect the established constitutional mechanism and delay should not be the sole basis for clemency. Other supervening circumstances should also be taken into account.

CONCLUSION

This landmark judgement has assured the death-row convicts of some rights. The Supreme Court has also framed various guidelines in this judgement. It was just short of providing a time frame within which the executive should dispose of the mercy petition. The court held that insanity and inordinate delay alone can be a ground for clemency.

 However, there has been a huge cry for the abolition of capital punishment altogether. But the Supreme Court, in this case, justified death by hanging as the most humane way of killing someone. Given the circumstances, the Supreme Court and the legislature should contemplate abolishing capital punishment altogether. There is also a need to expand the horizon of human rights in the country. This judgement is the first step towards this. However, there’s a need for more steps to be taken by the court.  

Check out LAW MENTOR for Case Summary

Abhilasha v. Parkash [2020 SCC Online SC 736]

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This Case Summary is written by Mayank rathor, a student at New Law College, Pune

Table Of Content

  • Introduction and background
  • Fact of case
  • Argument
  • Appellate argument
  • Respondent argument 
  • Issue
  • Case laws referred by the supreme court
  • Judgment
  • Critical analysis of the judgment
  • Conclusion

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The law of maintenance has its own importance. According to general and social concept of maintenance, it is the duty of man to maintain his entire family. In legal sense maintenance is the amount which is paid by a man to his dependent wife, children or parents to maintain themselves. 

Section 3( b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act defines maintenance ,1956. The concept of maintenance is not only recognised by all the personal law but also by the code of criminal procedure, 1973. However, the applicability of the

maintenance under personal law refers to the people belonging to that particular religion while a plea for maintenance under criminal procedure code, 1973 can be filled by the person irrespective of the caste, creed and religion. 

Abhilasha v. Parkash , is a appeal decided by the 3 judge bench of supreme Court, consisting of Hon’ble justice Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M. r. shah. 

In the present case, a situation is arise whether the court can exercised the jurisdiction under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act, 1956.when a maintenance application filed under section 125 of Cr.P.C. The court give the view that an unmarried hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she married relying on section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act, 1956 provided she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself and nor under section 125 of Cr.P.C. .

Whether the unmarried major daughter claim maintain under section 125 of  Cr.P.C. although she is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality or injury. 

Fact of Case

An application of maintenance filed by the mother of the appellant under section on 125 of  Cr.P.C. on behalf of herself, her two sons and the appellant ( daughter) against her husband (Parkash), claiming maintenance for herself and her three children. The learned judiciary magistrate of first class dismissed the application filed under section 125 of Cr.P.C. against appellant mother and her two brothers, but allowed the same for appellant for grant of maintenance till she attains the age of majority. Against this judgment, all the four applicants filled a criminal revision before the court of Sessions judge and the same was dismissed by the additional session judge with only modification that appellant was entitled to receive maintenance till 26 April 2005 instead of 7 February 2005,which was the date when she attain majority. Challenging the order of Sessions judge as well the judicial magistrate, an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. was filled before the high court by all the applicants, the same was dismissed by the high court. Aggrieved from the order passed by the high court, an appeal was filed by the appellant (Abhilasha) who is the daughter of respondent. 

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Appellant’s Argument

The appellant in the supreme Court, argued that even though the appellant had attained majority on 26 April 2005 , but since she is unmarried, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her father. Learned senior counsel contends thar high court committed error in dismissing the application fiked under section 482 of Cr.P.C. of the appellant on wrong premise that since appellant had attained majority and is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality, she is not entitled for any maintenance. Learned senior counsel relied on provision of section 20 of the Hindu Adoption And Maintenance act, 1956 and submits that as per section 20 obligation of a person to maintain his daughter, who is unmarried extends till she is married. Learned senior counsel relies on judgment of this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat Vs. Manju Lata and Others in support of her submission. She submits that High Court committed error in taking a contrary view to the above judgment of this Court. Ms. Learned senior counsel submits that appellant is still unemployed, hence, she is entitled to claim maintenance from her father.

Respondent’s Argument

The counsel for the respondent agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that Courts below have rightly confined the claim of the maintenance of the appellant till she attains majority on 26.04.2005. It is submitted that as per Section 125 Cr.P.C. entitlement to claim maintenance by daughter, who has attained majority is confined to case where the person by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain herself. Revisional Court has returned a finding that there is no case that appellant is by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury is unable to maintain herself. It is submitted that High Court has rightly dismissed the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of the appellant since no case was made out to interfere in orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and learned Revisional Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Issues

  1. Whether the appellant, who although had attained majority and is still unmarried is entitled to claim maintenance from her father in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. although she is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality/injury? 
  2. Whether the orders passed by learned Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Revisional Court limiting the claim of the appellant to claim maintenance till she attains majority on 26.04.2005 deserves to be set aside with direction to the respondent No.1 to continue to give maintenance even after 26.04.2005 till the appellant remains unmarried? 

Case laws referred by the supreme Court

  • A number of cases were referred by the supreme Court in order to deliver this judgment. Reliance was placed on precedent to understand the scope and ambit of section 488 of Cr.P.C., 1898, section 20 of Hindu Marriage And Maintenance Act, 1956 and section 125 of Cr.P.C., 1972.
  • The Court referred to the case of Nanak Chand v. Chandra kishore Aggarwal and Others, the Court held that there is no inconsistency between section 488 of Cr.P.C. and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act and both can stand together. This Court further held that section 488 Cr.P.C. and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act and both can stand together. This Court further held that section 488 of Cr.P.C. provides a summary remedy and is applicable to alll persons belonging to all religion and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. 
  • Next case referred by the Court is Ram Singh v. State, Allahabad high court took the view that section 18 of Hindu Adoption and Minority act, 1956 cannot be substitute for section 488 of Cr.P.C. , 1898. Court observe as follows
  • “There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act is intended to be a substitute for the provisions of Section 488 Cr.P.C. In fact the provisions of Section 18 of the Act cannot be a substitute for Section 488 Cr.P.C.”
  • Next case referred by the Court is Nalini Ranjan v. Kiran Rani, Patna high court held that section 488 of Cr.P.C. provided a separate remedy and section 488 of Cr.P.C. covered the civil liability of an husband under the personal law. 
  • Next case referred by the court is Mahabir Agarwalla v. Gita Roy, . Court has made the following observation. 

“An alternative but not inconsistent summary remedy was provided by section 488 of the Cr.P.C.not only to the Hindu wife but generally to wives irrespective of religion for recovery of maintenance from the  husband. The two remedies were, however, not co-extensive.”

  • Next case discussed by the Court is Jagadish Jugtawat v. Manju and other. In this case, the family Court allowed maintenance for minor girl till she married under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act, 1956. The relevant portion of the judgment of the high court os quoted here

“ it cannot be said that the order impugned runs counter to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the provisions of section 125 CrPC are applicable irrespective of the personal law and it does not make any distinction whether the daughter claiming maintenance is a Hindu or a Muslim. However, taking an overall view of the matter, I, with all respect to the Hon’ble Court, am of the candid view that the provisions require literal interpretation and a daughter would cease to have the benefit of the provisions under section 125 CrPC on attaining majority, though she would be entitled to claim the benefits further under the statute/personal law. But the Court is not inclined to interfere, as the order does not result in miscarriage of justice, rather interfering with the order would create great inconvenience to Respondent 3 as she would be forced to file another petition under sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Act of 1956 for further maintenance etc. Thus, in order to  avoid multiplicity of litigations, the order impugned does not warrant interference.”

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Judgment

The Supreme Court after listening to both sides of the story and examining the witnesses came to the conclusion as to the first issue that the right of unmarried daughter under section 20 to claim maintenance from her father when she is unable to maintain herself is absolute and the right given to unmarried daughter under section 20 is right granted under personal law, which can very well be enforced by her against her father, unmarried daughter is clearly entitled from maintenance from her father till she is married even though she has become major, which is statutory right recognised by section 20(3) and can be enforced by unmarried daughter in accordance with law.

The court held in related to second issue that the judicial magistrate while deciding proceedings under section 125 Cr.P.C. could not have exercised the jurisdiction under section 20(3) of act, 1956 and the submission of the appellant cannot be accepted that the court below should have allowed the application for maintenance even though she has become major. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the judicial magistrate first class as well as learned addition magistrate in not granting maintenance to appellant who has become major. Further the court accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that as preposition of law, an unmarried hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till  is married relying on section 20(3) of the act, 1956, provided she pleads and prove that she is unable to maintain herself . 

Critical analysis of judgment

The court decision under this case is appropriate because, the application made by appellant counsel under section 125 of Cr.P.C which provide maintenance for daughter till she attained majority and also after majority if she is mentally or physical incapable of maintain herself. Section 20(3) have no Overriding effect over section 125 . Both are exist together. The decision make it clear that under which court the person Institute a suit for maintenance according to its need and convenience.

The case made it clear in the suit of maintenance that 

  • If the parties to suit belong to city or town whose population exceeds one million then they must filed case in family court who has  jurisdiction to decide a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as the suit under Section 20 of Hindu Adoption amd Maintenance Act, 1956, in such case , Family Court can exercise jurisdiction under both the Acts and in an appropriate case can grant maintenance to unmarried daughter even though she has attained the age of majority. 
  • If there is no family court, proceedings under section 125 of Cr.P.C. shall have to be before the magistrate of the first class
  •  If Family Court is not established, a suit or proceedings for maintenance including the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act, 1956 shall only be before the District Court or any subordinate Civil Court.

Conclusion

 A Hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his parents, his wife, his unmarried daughters, and his minor child whether he possesses any property or not. If a person is healthy and able – bodies ,he must be held you have means to support his wife, children and parents The obligation to maintain these relations is personal in character and arises from the  Very existence of the relation between the parties. The purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C.  is to provide immediate relief through summary proceedings, whereas under Section 20 read with Section 3(b) of Act, 1956 contains larger right, which need to be decided by a Civil Court. Decision of judiciary magistrate of first class for not providing maintenance to appellant under section 20 of Hindu adoption and maintenance act was rightly decided. Every Court have to decide the case with in their sphere of power, so that power of different Court not overlapped and not cause miscarriage to justice system. However in the present case  justice be served by giving liberty to the appellant to  file the suit for maintenance under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, if so advised, for claiming any maintenance against her father.

https://lawmentor.in/2022/03/14/abhilasha-v-parkash-2020-scc-online-sc-736/

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala

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This Case Summary is written by Pratyaksha Roy, a student at Army Institute of Law, Mohali

INTRODUCTION

The “Sabarimala Case” i.e., Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, is a landmark judgement pronouncing the exclusion of women in the age group of 10 to 50 years from worshipping in the Sabarimala temple as unconstitutional. The Constitutional bench struck down the age-old discriminatory practice by lifting the legal ban prohibiting women of menstruating age from worshipping in the famous Hindu temple.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The Writ Petition in the present case was filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India on behalf of six women, members of the Indian Young Lawyers’ Association, who sought the Court’s intervention to dismantle a ban on the entry of women aged 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple on the ground that it violated their fundamental rights, particularly Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 and 25.

The case was taken up by a 5-judge bench compromising of the CJI Dipak Misra, Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra.

This legal ban was initially in force by way of subordinate legislation in the form of successive notifications issued in 1955 and 1956, but was eventually given judicial recognition and protection as a “usage” by the Kerala High Court in the case of S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board. 

JUDGEMENT

In the landmark judgement, the Bench unanimously (J. Indu Malhotra dissenting) decided in separate but concurring judgements to strike down the archaic exclusionary practice debarring women of procreative age from worshipping in the Sabarimala temple and declared it unconstitutional in nature and thereby, allowed the entry of women, irrespective of their age, into the temple on the grounds that the ban violated their fundamental right of Freedom of Religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution. 

Also, the provision restricting entry of women in the state legislation i.e., Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act, 1965 was declared ultra vires to Sections 3 and 4 of its parent Act, and was therefore, struck down and deemed unconstitutional. 

REASONING

The Respondents in the present case had submitted three major reasons in order to justify the continued exclusion of women from worshipping in the temple:

  • On the basis of menstruation-related pollution-

The exclusion of women in the present case was based upon a religious custom known as Vratham, which is a 41-day period of penance, involving the observance of purity of thought, word and deed by the devotee.

According to the respondents, women could not observe Vratham on the account of their monthly bleeding, which, according to them, is a period of bodily uncleanliness, and since no devotee was allowed to worship without having observed this ritual, therefore, menstruating women were not allowed to enter the temple and offer their prayers to the deity.

It is was held by the court that women too, could observe Vratham.

Menstruation did not mean that there was existence of sexual thoughts or presence of sexual activity; in fact, menstruation can be referred as the sole source of procreation.

  • On the basis of the celibate nature of the deity-

The deity residing in the Temple, i.e., Lord Ayyappa is in the form of Naishtika Brahmacharya, that means, he has taken the vow of celibacy.

Shri Swami Sivananda defines the true meaning of being a celibate or brahmacharya, which is, self-restraint, particularly, mastery or perfect control over the sexual organ or freedom from lust in thought, word and deed.

Therefore, merely being in the presence of women does not mean that the vow of celibacy will be broken, it would rather be said to be broken if the individual even so much as indulges himself in profane ideations, either in the presence or absence of women. The emphasis is on the restraint by the Brahmachari, rather than on the removal of all the temptations.

  • On the basis of the trek on the holy hills of Sabarimala-

It was argued that women cannot partake on the trek as it was strenuous in nature. To which, the Court rightfully enunciated that such a belief was “deeply rooted in a stereotypical (and constitutionally flawed) notion that women are the “weaker” sex.” Such an approach was therefore contrary to the constitutional guarantee of equality and dignity to women.

Regardless of the rationale that had been used for long to justify the interminable subjugation, oppression and exclusion of women devotees of Sabarimala from being able to freely practice their religious autonomy, it can inviolably be extrapolated that the practice was founded on beliefs surrounding misogyny, patriarchy and an overall perception of females being the weaker sex. 

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ANALYSIS 

The following judgement shall be assessed thoroughly on three major parameters:

  1. Religious Denomination-

Article 26 of the Indian Constitution deals with the rights guaranteed to the religious denominations in our country. In order for a group or set of individuals to be called a ‘religious denomination’, it must satisfy three requirements

  • It must be collection of individuals who have a system of belief or doctrine which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being-

In order to constitute a religious denomination, there must be new methodology provided for a religion. It was held that the mere observance of certain distinctive practices, even though they might have been in usage from a long time, did not make it a distinct religion on that account. Since there was nothing on record to show that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa had any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regarded as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa were pronounced to be Hindus and not a separate religious denomination.

  • It must be a common organisation-

The temple was dedicated to the public at large and represented truly, the plural character of society. Everyone, irrespective of religious belief, was allowed to worship the deity. The absence of a common spiritual organisation, which is a necessary element to constitute a religious denomination, was absent in the present case.

  • Designation of a distinctive name-

Although the respondents had tried to establish that the pilgrims coming to visit the Sabarimala temple, being devotees of Lord Ayyappa, were addressed as ‘Ayyappans’ and, thereby, the third condition in order to constitute a religious denomination was satisfied. However, this argument was outrightly rejected by the Court on the grounds that there was no officially recognized group called ‘Ayyappans’.

Since the collective of individuals were unable to satisfy the judicially-enunciated requirements to be declared as a religious denomination, therefore the devotees of Lord Ayyappa were held, as per majority, not to be a separate religious denomination and were thereby divested of their right to legally exclude women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from worshipping in the temple. Further, it was held that the temple’s denominational right to manage its own internal affairs, under Article 26(b), was now subject to the State’s social reform mandate under Article 25(2)(b). 

  1. Essential Practice-

Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed multiple criteria against which it decides what practices are ‘essential’ to various religions. In the Sabarimala temple case, the Court went on to declare that the exclusion of women was a non-essential practice based on the following grounds: 

  • For the want of textual and scriptural evidence in support of such a contention-

The unavailability of any texts, scriptures and doctrines acknowledging the exclusionary practice of prohibiting women from entering the temple certainly acted as an impediment to the court in the evaluation of the veracity of the exclusionary practice against such texts, scriptures, and doctrines. The Court thereby proceeded to examine whether the regulation or abolition of the practice in question would alter the ‘fundamental character’ of the religion itself.

Justices Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar very profoundly deduced that the exclusion of women from sacred spaces was not a fundamental part of Hinduism and held:

“In no scenario, it can be said that exclusion of women of any age group could be regarded as an essential practice of Hindu religion and on the contrary, it is an essential part of the Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as devotees and followers of Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity.”

  • Such exclusion of women was an altered practice that had changed with time-

Another indispensable criterion involved in discerning the essentiality of the practice was ascertaining whether the practice was homogenous i.e., whether it was practiced by the entire religious community with perpetuity. However, in the present case it was admitted by the Respondents that “prior to the passing of the Notification in 1950, women of all age groups used to visit the Sabarimala Temple for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children.”

For any practice to be conceived as central to the pursuit of a religion, it must first be established that the said practice is unalterable as well as popular in nature; it is essential that both criteria are fulfilled. With respect to the restriction on the entry of women into places of worship, even though the practice was widespread and popular, it was dismissed as unessential since it had been altered. 

  • The practice violated the fundamental right of all women to practice religion-

Since menstruation was a process strictly exclusive to the female gender, thus discriminating on the basis of menstruation amounted to discrimination against all women thereby violating their fundamental right to practice religion. Women of any age group had as much right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practice a religion, as guaranteed under Article 25(1).

It was against the basic constitutional values of dignity, liberty and equality-

While determining the essentiality of a practice, the courts examined whether by granting constitutional protection to the practice in question and by affixing it with the label of an ‘essential’ practice to the concerned religion, the Indian state’s vision of a society based on principles of equality, liberty and fraternity would be compromised. This further led to a debate on ‘Constitutional Morality’, which shall be discussed in the next point.

  1. Constitutional Morality-

The term ‘morality’ occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution in the present case was taken to mean ‘Constitutional Morality’.

Restricting the entry of women into a temple either on the ground that they menstruate or that their entry would inevitably cause deviation to the celibacy of the temple’s deity, violates the “internal morality” of the Constitution as it is a threat to the notion of equality and dignity underscored by the Constitution. Such a restriction can only be valid in a society where women are seen as innately lesser beings, who should not enjoy dignified lives. The Constitution lifts us away from such a society and pushes toward an equality that is both formal and substantive.

Moreover, one of the laudable findings made by Justice Chandrachud in the present case, is on ‘untouchability’. Adhering to usage in Article 17, untouchability of ‘all forms’, the judge deviated from the previous Supreme Court judgments that confined the concept of untouchability to caste-based exclusions and rather identified it with the notions of “purity and pollution” as the sustaining force of untouchability and found it to be against the tenets of dignity and constitutional morality. He held that Article 17 is a powerful guarantee against exclusion and cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind had been practiced and legitimized on notions of “purity and pollution”.

CONCLUSION

The Sabarimala judgment was a watershed moment in the history of affirmative action as it greased the wheels of social integration and breathed life into feminist jurisprudence. The Supreme Court adopted a reformist and interventionist approach by upholding human dignity and equal entitlement to worship for all individuals.

Yashwant Sinha Vs CBI & Others

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Review Petition (Criminal) No. 46 of 2019 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018

FACTS

The case is concerned with three documents that provided evidence in the political controversy surrounding the Rafale arms deal: a 7.8 billion euro weapons deal to purchase 36 Rafale fighter planes from France. The dispute arose after the Indian prime minister announced a decision during a 2015 visit to Paris to buy the aircraft, manufactured by Dassault Aviation. 

On 15th December 2018, the Indian Supreme Court held that there was no occasion to doubt the decision-making process of the Modi government. The court dismissed all the petitions seeking a review of the decision via a CBI investigation. On 2nd January 2019, ministers Yashwant Sinha, Arun Shourie and Advocate Prashant Hushan appealed to the Supreme Court to review the Rafale verdict. 

On 6th March 2019, the CBI informed the Supreme Court that documents relating to the Rafale deal had been stolen from the Defence Ministry. 

On 10th April 2019, the Supreme Court dismissed the preliminary objection by the CBI opposing the inclusion of the leaked documents. In November 2019, the Hon’ble Court dismissed the review petitions against its verdict within the deal on the grounds that they lacked merit. 

QUESTION OF LAW

Whether there has been a violation of,

  1. Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India (On ‘The Hindu’s right to publish documents)
  2. Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Acts,1923
  3. Section 8(2) of the Right to Information Act,2005
  4. Section 123 of the India Evidence Act,1872

HELD

The case is famously known as ‘the Rafale​​ case’. A three-judge bench comprising of Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Kaul and Justice Joseph dismissed all the review petitions and gave a clean chit to the NDA government effectively denying the corruption allegations in the Rafale deal regarding the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jets.​​ The court, in this case, highlighted that the documents which are covered under the Official Secrets Act could be produced in the court as evidence in the interest of public justice​​ that is the​​ court can rely on such documents in order to do justice, and its unauthorized publication does not affect its evidentiary value.

Submitted By: Shweta Tated

Source: Team Attorneylex